Benutzerdefiniertes Cover
Benutzerdefiniertes Cover
Normale Ansicht MARC-Ansicht ISBD

Relational Supply Contracts : Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements / by Michaela Isabel Höhn

Von: Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: SpringerLink Bücher | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 629Verlag: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Beschreibung: Online-Ressource (XVI, 124 p. 31 illus, digital)ISBN:
  • 9783642027918
Schlagwörter: Andere physische Formen: 9783642027901 | Buchausg. u.d.T.: Relational supply contracts. Berlin : Springer, 2010. XVI, 121 S.DDC-Klassifikation:
  • 658.72
  • 658.5 658.72
RVK: RVK: QP 321LOC-Klassifikation:
  • HD39.5
  • HD38.5
DOI: DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8Online-Ressourcen:
Inhalte:
IntroductionLiterature Review on Supply Chain Contracting -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook.
Zusammenfassung: Literature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and OutlookZusammenfassung: Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented modelPPN: PPN: 1648809596Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-SBE
Dieser Titel hat keine Exemplare