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Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains / by Julia Drechsel
Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: SpringerLink Bücher | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 644Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Description: Online-Ressource (XIV, 167p. 20 illus., 10 illus. in color, digital)ISBN:- 9783642137259
- 330.0151
- 330
- 330.015195 23
- 658.5
- 658.7/2
- HB139-141
- HB144
Contents:
Summary: Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- Cooperation in Supply Chains -- An Economic Lot Sizing Game -- A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand -- A Capacitated Lot Sizing Game with Transshipments, Scarce Capacities, and Player-Dependent Cost Coefficients -- A Multilevel Lot Sizing Game with Restricted Cooperation -- Conclusions and Future ResearchSummary: The presented work combines two areas of research: cooperative game theory and lot size optimization. One of the most essential problems in cooperations is to allocate cooperative profits or costs among the partners. The core is a well known method from cooperative game theory that describes efficient and stable profit/cost allocations. A general algorithm based on the idea of constraint generation to compute core elements for cooperative optimization problems is provided. Beside its application for the classical core, an extensive discussion of core variants is presented and how they can be handled with the proposed algorithm. The second part of the thesis contains several cooperative lot sizing problems of different complexity that are analyzed regarding theoretical properties like monotonicity or concavity and solved with the proposed row generation algorithm to compute core elements; i.e. determining stable and fair cost allocationsPPN: PPN: 1650081081Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-SBE
Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory; 2.1 History of Game Theory; 2.2 Basics in Cooperative Game Theory; 2.2.1 A Cooperative Game; 2.2.2 Properties of Cooperative Games; 2.2.3 Variants and Fundamental Applications of the Classical Cooperative Game; 2.2.4 Interval-Valued Games; 2.3 Allocating Cooperative Costs; 2.3.1 Motivation and Classification of Allocation Methods; 2.3.2 Properties of Cost Allocations; 2.3.3 Non-Game-Theoretical Cost Allocation Methods
2.3.4 The Core2.3.5 Additive Core Variants; 2.3.6 Multiplicative Core Variants; 2.3.7 The Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 2.3.8 The Interval Core; 2.3.9 The Shapley Value; 2.3.10 Conclusions; Chapter 3 Algorithmic Game Theory; 3.1 Literature; 3.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations; 3.3 Theoretical Background; 3.4 Including Fairness Criteria; 3.5 Computing Core Variants; 3.6 Computing Interval Core Elements; 3.7 Conclusions; Chapter 4 Cooperation in Supply Chains; 4.1 Horizontal versus Vertical Cooperation; 4.2 Supply Chain Games in the Literature; Chapter 5 An Economic Lot Sizing Game
5.1 Cooperative Ordering Situations5.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 5.1.2 Properties of the ELS Game; 5.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the ELS Game; 5.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 5.2.2 A Numerical Example; 5.3 Computational Study for the ELS Game; 5.4 Extensions for the ELS Game; Chapter 6 A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand; 6.1 The Underlying Problem; 6.2 Special Phenomena of Interval Cores; 6.3 A New Definition of the Interval Core and Its Computation; 6.4 Computational Study for the Interval ELS Game
Chapter 7 A Capacitated Lot Sizing Game with Transshipments, Scarce Capacities, and Player-Dependent Cost Coefficients7.1 Cooperative Production Situations; 7.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 7.1.2 The CLSP Game; 7.1.3 Properties of the CLSP Game; 7.2 Solving the Cooperative CLSP; 7.2.1 A Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic; 7.2.2 A Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic; 7.3 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the CLSP Game; 7.3.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 7.3.2 Computing the Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 7.3.3 Computing the Minmax Core; 7.4 Computational Study for the CLSP Game
7.4.1 Computational Study: Lagrangean RelaxationBased Heuristic7.4.2 Computational Study: Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic; 7.4.3 Computational Study: Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 7.4.4 Computational Study: Minmax Core; 7.5 Extensions for the CLSP Game; Chapter 8 A Multilevel Lot Sizing Game with Restricted Cooperation; 8.1 Cooperative Supply Situations; 8.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 8.1.2 Games with Restricted Cooperation; 8.1.3 Properties of the MLCLSP Game; 8.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the MLCLSP Game; 8.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 8.2.2 A Numerical Example
8.2.3 Computing Core Variants
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