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Strategic Social Choice : Stable Representations of Constitutions / by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare | SpringerLink BücherPublisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Description: Online-Ressource (XVIII, 154 p, digital)ISBN:- 9783642138751
- 330.0151
- 330
- 302.1 23
- 302.13
- HB144
- HB846-HB846.8
- HB846.8
Contents:
Summary: Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of votersSummary: This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitutionPPN: PPN: 1650082088Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-SBE
Strategic Social Choice; Preface; Contents; Preview to this book; Part I Representations of constitutions; Chapter 1 Introduction to Part I; Chapter 2 Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Chapter 3 Nash consistent representations; Chapter 4 Acceptable representations; Chapter 5 Strongly consistent representations; Chapter 6 Nash consistent representation through lottery models; Chapter 7 On the continuity of representations of constitutions; Part II Consistent voting; Chapter 8 Introduction to Part II; Chapter 9 Feasible elimination procedures
Chapter 10 Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functionsChapter 11 Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters; References; Author Index; Subject Index
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