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Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets / by Milan Horniacek

By: Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: SpringerLink Bücher | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 649Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011Description: Online-Ressource (VII, 92p, digital)ISBN:
  • 9783642197635
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: 9783642197628 | Buchausg. u.d.T.: Cooperation and efficiency in markets. Berlin : Springer, 2011. VII, 92 S.DDC classification:
  • 330.0151
  • 330
  • 330.1 23
  • 338.6/048 381.1015118
MSC: MSC: *91-02 | 91A20 | 91A80 | 91B26 | 91B54RVK: RVK: QH 430 | QP 450LOC classification:
  • HB144
  • HB1-846.8
  • HG4915
DOI: DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5Online resources:
Contents:
Cooperation and Efficiencyin Markets; Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 Choice of Solution Concepts; 1.2 Choice of Non-collusive Benchmarks; 1.3 Mathematical Notations; References; Chapter 2: Model; 2.1 Stage Game; 2.2 Repeated Game; 2.3 Solution Concepts; References; Chapter 3: Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE; 3.1 Existence of an SRPE; 3.2 Existence of an SSPE; Chapter 4: Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE; 4.1 Natural Oligopoly; 4.2 Natural Oligopsony; 4.3 Impact on Consumer Welfare
4.3.1 Comparison with a Monopsonist Choosing the Traded Quantities on the Demand Side and Price Taking Behavior on the Supply Side of the Analyzed Market4.3.2 Comparison with Price Taking Behavior on the Demand Side and a Cournot Oligopoly on the Supply Side of the Analyzed Market; References; Chapter 5: Afterword; References; Index
Summary: Introduction -- Model -- Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE -- AfterwordSummary: The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfarePPN: PPN: 1650974566Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-SBE
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