Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit / by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: SpringerBriefs in Operations Management | SpringerLink BücherPublisher: Cham : Springer, 2016Description: Online-Ressource (IX, 129 p. 37 illus, online resource)ISBN:- 9783319186726
- HD30.23
Contents:
Summary: Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.Summary: This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.PPN: PPN: 1657534472Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-SEB | ZDB-2-SXBM | ZDB-2-BUM
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