Algorithmic Game Theory : 14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Aarhus, Denmark, September 21–24, 2021, Proceedings / edited by Ioannis Caragiannis, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen

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Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; 12885Publisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021Publisher: Cham : Imprint: Springer, 2021Edition: 1st ed. 2021Description: 1 Online-Ressource(XXIII, 414 p. 34 illus., 18 illus. in color.)ISBN:

9783030859473

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Additional physical formats: 9783030859466 | 9783030859480 | Erscheint auch als: 9783030859466 Druck-Ausgabe | Erscheint auch als: 9783030859480 Druck-AusgabeDDC classification:

003.3 23

DOI: DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3Online resources:

Summary: Auctions and Mechanism Design -- Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming -- The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions -- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation -- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location -- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values -- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection -- Computational Aspects of Games -- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents -- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms -- Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts -- Algorithmic Challenges in Information Design XVII -- On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games -- Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures -- Markets and Matchings -- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching -- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets -- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget -- Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets -- The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences -- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality? -- Social Choice and Cooperative Games -- Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information -- Hedonic Expertise Games -- When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores -- Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values -- An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy -- Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers -- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees -- Abstracts -- On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools -- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap -- Vote Delegation and Misbehavio.Summary: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.* The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games. * The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.PPN: PPN: 1772262587Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-2-LNC | ZDB-2-SCS | ZDB-2-SXCS | ZDB-2-SEB

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