Efficiently breaking the folk theorem by reliably communicating long term commitments / David Levine
Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Discussion papers ; DP18808Verlag: London : Centre for Economic Policy Research, 03 February 2024Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)Genre/Form: Online-Ressourcen: Zusammenfassung: The introduction of artificially intelligent algorithms in pricing decisions by firms has triggered a literature in industrial organization asking if the use of these algorithms will lead to collusive outcomes. In a simple repeated game environment it is shown that if algorithms can be reliably communicated or inferred the folk theorem breaks and the long-run outcome must be collusive.PPN: PPN: 1881105733Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-CEPPDieser Titel hat keine Exemplare