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Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance / edited by Donato Masciandaro (Full Professor of Economics and Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation, Bocconi University, Italy) and Marc Quintyn (Division Chief, International Monetary Fund's Institute, US)
Mitwirkende(r): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Verlag: Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource (528 pages) : illustrationsISBN:- 9781035352197
- 354.8 22
- HG1725
Inhalte:
Zusammenfassung: This book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions. For a long time the design of supervision had been an irrelevant issue, both in theory and practice. This perception changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, and over the past decade many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of financial supervision. This book presents frameworks for analyzing the emerging supervisory architectures and sheds light on the different supervisory regimes, with a particular focus on the role of central banks. It takes a country-specific, comparative and empirical approach. Designing Financial Supervision Institutions will be an accessible reference tool for multidisciplinary scholars and academics (principally economics, but also politics and law), policymakers, regulators and supervisory institutions. All royalties from this book to go to the UK charity, NSPCCPPN: PPN: 192210504XPackage identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE | ZDB-77-EEC | ZDB-77-ECE | ZDB-1-EWE-ebook
Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi -- The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup -- Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini -- Financial supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro -- Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini -- Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Cihak and Richard Podpiera -- Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia -- Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriette Prast -- Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini -- Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis.
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