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The political economy of the New Deal / the late Jim F. Couch (formerly Associate Professor of Economics, University of North Alabama, US) and William F. Shughart II (J. Fish Smith Professor in Public Choice, Utah State University, US)

Von: Mitwirkende(r): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: The Locke Institute seriesVerlag: Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 247 pages) : illustrationsISBN:
  • 9781035335411
Schlagwörter: Andere physische Formen: 9781858988993. | Erscheint auch als: 9781858988993 | Elektronische Reproduktion von: The political economy of the New Deal. Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, 1998. XVI, 247 SDDC-Klassifikation:
  • 338.973/009/043 21
LOC-Klassifikation:
  • HC106.3
Online-Ressourcen:
Inhalte:
Contents: Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A concise history of the great depression -- 3. The farm crisis and rural relief -- 4. The first new deal -- 5. The second new deal -- 6. Did the new dealers respond to economic need? -- 7. Politics and patterns of new deal spending -- 8. The political economy of the new deal -- 9. Summary and conclusions -- References -- Index.
Zusammenfassung: The Political Economy of the New Deal explores the political and economic forces that shaped the highly uneven distribution of federal emergency relief spending during the Great Depression. It presents new empirical evidence on the Roosevelt administration's response to the Great Depression, and shows how this was influenced more by presidential politics than by the plight of the unemployed millions. The authors apply public choice theory to data produced by the Roosevelt administration to produce an empirical model of New Deal spending decisions. It reassesses the role played by politics in shaping the policies adopted by the New Dealers through a detailed analysis of the distribution of federal emergency relief funds. The authors present new econometric evidence supporting the idea that President Roosevelt used the New Deal to buy electoral votes. They suggest that states with healthier economies attracted disproportionately larger shares of the federal government's relief funds simply because they could afford the programs' costs; and that states whose citizens were in greatest economic need were required to bear more of the cost of financing projects. The results from this analysis suggest that while economic need was certainly not ignored, political considerations dominated the distribution of New Deal dollars. This book examines the origins of the modern American welfare state from a public choice perspective and will be of great interest to economists and political scientists, as well as those interested in the economic history of the United StatesPPN: PPN: 1922107190Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE | ZDB-77-EEC | ZDB-77-ECE | ZDB-1-EWE-ebook
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