Microfinance games / Xavier Gine ...[et al.]

Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Policy research working paper ; 3959Publisher: [Washington, D.C] : World Bank, [2006]Description: Online-RessourceSubject(s): Additional physical formats: Erscheint auch als: Microfinance games Druck-AusgabeLOC classification:
  • HG3881.5.W57
Online resources: Additional physical formats: Also available in print.Summary: "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web sitePPN: PPN: 724220860Package identifier: Produktsigel: GBV-wba | ZDB-1-WBA | ZDB-110-WBL
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