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Handbook of game theory with economic applications : volume 1 / edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart
Mitwirkende(r): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: Handbooks in economics ; 11Verlag: Amsterdam ; New York ; New York, N.Y., USA : North-Holland, 1992Beschreibung: Online Ressource (xvi, 733 pages)ISBN:- 0444880984
- 9780444880987
- 519.3
- HB144
Inhalte:
Zusammenfassung: This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethicsPPN: PPN: 789703963Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-HBE-ebook | ZDB-1-HBE | ZDB-33-EBS | ZDB-33-ESD | BSZ-33-EBS-HSAA
Vol. 1.Game of chess / Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
Games in extenive and strategic forms / Sergiu Hart
Games with perfect information / Jan Mycielski
Repeated games with complete information / Sylvain Sorin
Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum / Shmuel Zamir
Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum / Françoise Forges
Noncooperative models of bargaining / Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
Strategic analysis of auctions / Robert Wilson
Location / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse
Strategic models of entry deterrence / Robert Wilson
Patent licensing / Morton I. Kamien
Core and balancedness / Yakar Kannai
Axiomatizations of the core / Bezalel Peleg
Core in perfectly competitive economics / Robert M. Anderson
Core in imperfectly competitive economies / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
Two-sided matching / Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets / William F. Lucas
Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus / Michael Maschler
Game and decision theoretic models in ethics / John C. Harsanyi.
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