Custom cover image
Custom cover image

The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx

By: Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: The MIT Press SerPublisher: Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, c2012Description: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (xii, 302 p.)) : illISBN:
  • 9781280498930
  • 1280498935
  • 9780262301503
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: 0262017326 | 9780262017329. | 1280498234 | Erscheint auch als: The economics of collusion. Druck-Ausgabe Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press, 2012. XII, 302 S.DDC classification:
  • 338.82
  • 338.8/2 23
RVK: RVK: QR 200 | QR 300LOC classification:
  • HF5417
  • HF5417.M37 2012eb
Online resources: Summary: An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected.Summary: Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Motivating Example -- 1.2 Collusion within Porter's Five Forces -- 1.3 Difficulties of Collusion -- 1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion -- 1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion -- 1.6 Price Formation Process -- 1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion -- 1.8 Cartel Detection -- 1.9 Outline of the Book -- 1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion -- Part I. Collusion in Practice -- Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel -- 2.1 The Story Begins -- 2.2 Initiation of the Cartel -- 2.3 Market Share Division -- 2.4 Price Increases and Announcements -- 2.5 Sales Force Issues -- 2.6 Redistributions -- 2.7 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring -- 3.1 Preamble -- 3.2 The Instruction Begins -- 3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring -- 3.4 Ring Logistics -- 3.5 Ring Membership -- 3.6 Auctioneer's Response -- 3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments -- 3.8 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection -- 4.1 Preamble -- 4.2 The Seminar Begins -- 4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions -- 4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion -- 4.5 Questions and Answers -- Part II. Economics of Cartels -- Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels -- 5.1 Basics -- 5.2 Buyer Resistance -- 5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance -- 5.4 Collusive Outcomes -- 5.5 Incentives for Cheating -- 5.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels -- 6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution -- 6.2 Pricing Structures -- 6.3 Allocation Structures -- 6.4 Enforcement Structures -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation -- Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry -- 7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments.PPN: PPN: 809657120Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-26-MYL | ZDB-30-PBE | ZDB-30-PQE | ZDB-30-PAD | ZDB-30-PUP
No physical items for this record
KIT – The University in the Helmholtz Association                         Home | Impressum | Datenschutz | Barrierefreiheit | KIT