Can risk averse competitive input providers serve farmers efficiently in developing countries ? / Paul Makdissi, Quentin Wodon
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Policy research working paper ; 4922Publisher: [Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2009Description: Online-RessourceSubject(s):- PERFECT COMPETITION
- POLITICAL ECONOMY
- PRICE CEILINGS
- PRIVATIZATION
- PRODUCE
- PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS
- PRODUCTION COST
- PRODUCTION FUNCTION
- PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
- PUBLIC GOOD
- REPAYMENT
- RISK AVERSE
- RISK AVERSION
- RURAL CREDIT
- SEEDS
- SMALL SCALE FARMERS
- SOCIAL WELFARE
- TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
- UTILITY FUNCTION
- WEALTH
- AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
- AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
- AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
- AGRICULTURAL SECTORS
- AGRICULTURE
- COCOA
- COFFEE
- COMMODITY
- CONSUMER SURPLUS
- CONTRACT FARMING
- CORRUPTION
- COTTON
- COTTON PRODUCTION
- COTTON SECTOR
- CREDIT MARKETS
- CREDIT RATING
- CREDIT RATING SYSTEM
- CROP
- CROPPING
- CROPS
- ECONOMIC MODELS
- ELASTICITY
- ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
- ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY
- EQUILIBRIUM
- EXPECTED UTILITY
- EXPECTED VALUE
- EXPORT CROPS
- FARM
- FARMER
- FARMERS
- FERTILIZERS
- FREE ACCESS
- GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
- GROUNDNUT
- HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
- INEFFICIENCY
- INELASTIC DEMAND
- INEQUALITY
- INTERNATIONAL BANK
- LABOR MARKET
- LABOR MARKETS
- MARGINAL BENEFITS
- MARGINAL COST
- NASH EQUILIBRIUM
- NATURAL RESOURCES
- OLIGOPOLY
- OPTIMIZATION
- HG3881.5.W57
Also available in print.
Reproduktion, 2009. (World Bank eLibrary). Also available in print |2009||||||||||
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