Information asymmetries and institutional investor mandates / Tatiana Didier
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Publisher: Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2011Description: Online-Ressource (59 p)Additional physical formats: Didier, Tatiana: Information asymmetries and institutional investor mandates DOI: DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5586Online resources: Summary: The preference among foreign institutional investors for large firms is widely documented. This paper deepens our understanding of international investments by providing evidence that foreign institutional investors with broader investment scopes prefer to invest in firms where they are less prone to information disadvantages than more specialized ones. In other words, there is heterogeneity in how information asymmetries affect investors' portfolio choices. Theoretically, a model with costly information and short-selling constraints shows that the broader the investor's mandate, the smaller the incentives to gather and process costly information. Empirically, an analysis of the mutual fund industry in the United States supports this hypothesisPPN: PPN: 834969661Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-WBA | ZDB-110-WBLNo physical items for this record
2011. (World Bank eLibrary) |2011||||||||||