International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability : An Economic Theory Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon / Kaushik Basu
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Publisher: Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2013Description: Online-Ressource (31 p)Additional physical formats: Basu, Kaushik: International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability DOI: DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6555Online resources: Summary: As the Eurozone crisis drags on, it is evident that a part of the problem lies in the architecture of debt and its liabilities within the Eurozone and, more generally, the European Union. This paper argues that a large part of the problem can be mitigated by permitting appropriately-structured cross-country liability for sovereign debt incurred by individual nations within the European Union. In brief, the paper makes a case for amending the Treaty of Lisbon. The case is established by constructing a game-theoretic model and demonstrating that there exist self-fulfilling equilibria, which would come into existence if cross-country debt liability were permitted and which are Pareto superior to the existing outcomePPN: PPN: 834979365Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-WBA | ZDB-110-WBLNo physical items for this record
Reproduktion, 2013. (World Bank eLibrary) |2013||||||||||