Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game / by Christian Feige and Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Working paper series in economics ; No. 73Publisher: Karlsruhe : KIT [u.a.], November 2015Description: 1 Online-Ressource (26 Seiten)Subject(s): Genre/Form: Online resources: Summary: In a laboratory experiment, we investigate if groups consisting of two heterogeneous player types (with different marginal contribution costs) can increase their total contributions and payoffs in a threshold public goods game if transfer payments are possible among the players. We find that transfer payments are indeed used in many groups to shift contributions from high-cost players to low-cost players, thereby not only increasing social welfare, but also equalizing payoffs. In a repeated setting with individual voluntary contributions and transfers, this redistribution effect takes a few rounds to manifest and high-cost players benefit the most in terms of payoffs. The same beneficial effect of transfer payments can also be achieved in a one-shot setting by having the groups vote unanimously on contributions and transfers of all players.PPN: PPN: 839327870No physical items for this record
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