A quantitative version of Myerson regularity / by Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech
Mitwirkende(r): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: Working paper series in economics ; No. 76Verlag: Karlsruhe : KIT [u.a.], December 2015Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten)Schlagwörter: Genre/Form: Online-Ressourcen: Zusammenfassung: In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as a quantitative measure of how regular a distribution is. L-regularity includes Myerson regularity and the monotone hazard rate condition as special cases. We show that L-regularity implies sharp bounds on various key quantities in auction theory, thus extending several recent findings from quantitative auction and mechanism design.PPN: PPN: 843970278Dieser Titel hat keine Exemplare
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