Redistribution and group participation : experimental evidence from Africa and the UK / Marcel Fafchamps, Ruth Vargas Hill
Mitwirkende(r): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: World Bank E-Library Archive | Policy research working paper ; 8330Verlag: Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Economics Vice Presidency, Strategy and Operations Team, February 2018Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten) : IllustrationenSchlagwörter: Genre/Form: Andere physische Formen: Erscheint auch als: Redistribution and Group Participation: Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK. Druck-Ausgabe Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018DOI: DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8330Online-Ressourcen: Zusammenfassung: This paper investigates whether the prospect of redistribution hinders the formation of efficiency-enhancing groups. An experiment is conducted in a Kenyan slum, Ugandan villages, and a UK university town and used to test, in an anonymous setting with no feedback, whether subjects join a group that increases their endowment but exposes them to one of three redistributive actions: stealing, giving, or burning. Exposure to redistributive options among group members operates as a disincentive to join a group. This finding obtains under all three treatments-including when the pressure to redistribute is intrinsic. However, the nature of the redistribution affects the magnitude of the impact. Giving has the least impact on the decision to join a group, whilst forced redistribution through stealing or burning acts as a much larger deterrent to group membership. These findings are common across all three subject pools, but African subjects are particularly reluctant to join a group in the burning treatment, indicating strong reluctance to expose themselves to destruction by othersPPN: PPN: 1016355122Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-WBA | ZDB-110-WBODieser Titel hat keine Exemplare
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