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The political economy of wages and unemployment : a neoclassical exploration / William Oliver Coleman (The Australian National University)

By: Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Edward Elgar E-Book ArchivePublisher: Cheltenham, U.K ; Northampton, Mass, USA : Edward Elgar, 2010Description: 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 342 pages) : diagramsISBN:
  • 9781849808118
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: 9781848446571. | Erscheint auch als: The political economy of wages and unemployment. Druck-Ausgabe Cheltenham [u.a.] : Edward Elgar, 2010. VIII, 242 S.DDC classification:
  • 331.137
RVK: RVK: QC 310LOC classification:
  • HD5706
DOI: DOI: 10.4337/9781849808118Online resources: Production credits:
  • In this tightly argued work William Coleman explores the macroeconomic implications of politically based restraints on competition in labour markets. Through a suite of compact models the author investigates the consequences of the labour force securing the best terms of sale for its labour by means of the electoral mechanism. He concludes that such ‘electorally optimal’ labour regulation can explain not only wage rigidity and unemployment, but also wage volatility; episodes of excess demand for labour; the co-existence of an inefficient state sector with an efficient private sector; and the preference for a minimum wage over a universal wage regulation. Finally, the approach can rationalize nominal wage rigidity, and not solely real wage rigidity. In sum, the analysis promises to both complete the Classical explanation of unemployment by predicting when, why and how real wages will be rigid, and at the same time to better secure Keynesian insights by suggesting how money rigidity may be characteristic of electorally optimal labour regulation.
Summary: 1. The problem labour monopoly might solve -- 2. The fall and rise of labour monopoly theory -- 3. How a wage bill hill creates a wage rate floor -- 4. Why the floor will fluctuate -- 5. How bargaining may build a ceiling instead of a floor -- 6. How foresight may (and may not) defeat the floor -- 7. Why the 'property-owning democracy' may nationalize capital rather than regulate labour -- 8. Unemployment as a benefit of unemployment benefits -- 9. Why the majority may choose the wage of the minority -- 10. Rigidity and volatility in the face of the cycle : a neoklassikal analysis -- 11. Labour monopoly as the source of money wage rigidity : a hypothesis -- 12. A concluding comment.Summary: In this tightly argued work William Coleman explores the macroeconomic implications of politically based restraints on competition in labour marketsPPN: PPN: 1023442531Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE
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