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The economics of modern business enterprise / Martin Ricketts

Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: An Elgar reference collection | The international library of critical writings in economics ; 214 | Edward Elgar E-Book ArchivePublisher: Cheltenham, Glos, UK ; Northampton, Mass : Edward Elgar, 2008Description: 1 Online-Ressource (3 v) ; cmISBN:
  • 9781785367052
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: Erscheint auch als: The economics of modern business enterprise. Druck-Ausgabe. Cheltenham, UK [u.a.] : Elgar, 2008DDC classification:
  • 338.5 22
LOC classification:
  • HF5351
DOI: DOI: 10.4337/9781785367052Online resources: Summary: Martin Ricketts, a leading scholar in this field, has selected the seminal papers from a variety of traditions that illustrate the evolution of thinking on 'the firm' over a considerable period of time. The firm as a vehicle for entrepreneurial initiative and the exercise of business judgement is contrasted throughout with the firm as a policing mechanism in response to known contractual hazards. The selection is in three volumes that cover respectively the general theoretical background; the ownership and scope of the firm - its degree of vertical and transnational integration; and agency issues relating to employee incentives and the control of managers. This authoritative collection will provide a valuable reference, of interest to students, postgraduates and professional economists seeking an overview of the subject and its evolutionSummary: Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), October, 305-60 -- Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), 'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (2), April, 225-64 -- Joseph G. Haubrich (1994), 'Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem', Journal of Political Economy, 102 (2), April, 258-76 -- Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman (1998), 'Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIII (3), August, 653-91 -- Eugene F. Fama (1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288-307 -- Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), 'Agency Problems and Residual Claims', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 327-49 -- Oliver D. Hart (1983), 'The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme', Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (2), Autumn, 366-82 -- Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110-20 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1980), 'Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation', Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (1), Spring, 42-64 -- Michael C. Jensen (1988), 'Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (1), Winter, 21-48 -- Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers (1988), 'Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers', in Alan J. Auerbach (ed) (ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL: NBER and University of Chicago Press, 33-56 -- Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1986), 'Large Shareholders and Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3, Part 1), June, 461-88 -- Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27 -- Jens Köke and Luc Renneboog (2005), 'Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes', Journal of Law and Economics, XLVIII, October, 475-516Summary: Recommended readings (Machine generated): Frank H. Knight (1921), 'Enterprise and Profit', in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Chapter IX, Boston, MA and New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 264-90 -- R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), New Series, November, 386-405 -- Fritz Machlup (1967), 'Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial', American Economic Review, LVII (1), March, 1-33 -- Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777-95 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1981), 'The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', Journal of Economic Literature, XIX (4), December, 1537-68 -- Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison (1980), 'Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation', Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (2), Autumn, 715-20 -- Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1987), 'Reflections on the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143 (1), March, 110-36 -- Alfred Marshall ([1925]1953), 'Industrial Organization, Continued. Business Management', in Principles of Economics, 8th Edition, Book IV, Chapter XII, New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 291-313 -- Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950), 'Crumbling Walls', in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Chapter XII, London: Allen & Unwin, 131-42 -- Israel M. Kirzner (1973), 'The Entrepreneur', in Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 30-87 -- B.J. Loasby (1982), 'The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 29 (3), November, 235-45 -- Ulrich Witt (1987), 'How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143 (1), March, 180-95 -- Nicolai Juul Foss (1993), 'Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives', Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3 (2), May, 127-44 -- Mark Casson (2000), 'An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm', in Enterprise and Leadership: Studies on Firms, Markets and Networks, Chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 47-82 -- Kenneth J. Arrow (1985), 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt (ed) and Richard J. Zeckhauser (ed) (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Chapter 2, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 37-51 -- Steven Shavell (1979), 'Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 55-73 -- Martin Ricketts (1986), 'The Geometry of Principal and Agent: Yet Another Use for the Edgeworth Box', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 33 (3), August, 228-48 -- Harold Demsetz (1995), 'Agency and Nonagency Explanations of the Firm's Organization', in The Economics of the Business Firm: Seven Critical Commentaries, Second Commentary, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 15-39, referencesSummary: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber (2000), 'The Fable of Fisher Body', Journal of Law and Economics, XLIII (1), April, 67-104 -- Ronald Coase (2006), 'The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2), Summer, 255-78 -- Benjamin Klein (2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body- General Motors', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14 (1), February, 1-36 -- John M. Vernon and Daniel A. Graham (1971), 'Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 79 (4), 924-5 -- Richard Schmalensee (1973), 'A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 81 (2, Part 1), March-April, 442-9 -- Martin K. Perry (1980), 'Forward Integration by Alcoa: 1888- 1930', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXIX (1), September, 37-53 -- John H. Dunning (1973), 'The Determinants of International Production', Oxford Economic Papers, 25 (3), New Series, November, 289-336 -- Alfred D. Chandler (1980), 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis', Economic History Review, 33 (3), New Series, August, 396-410 -- John Cantwell (2000), 'A Survey of Theories of International Production', in Christos N. Pitelis (ed) and Roger Sugden (ed) (eds), The Nature of the Transnational Firm, Second Edition, Chapter 2, London: Routledge, 10-56 -- Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden (1987), 'The Rise of Transnationals and the International Division of Labour', in Transnational Monopoly Capitalism, Chapter 4, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books and New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 61-79, references -- Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris (1975), 'Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1), Spring, 250-78 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (2), Autumn, 552-79 -- Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984), 'Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device', American Economic Review, 74 (3), June, 433-44 -- Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), 'Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841-64 -- Edward P. Lazear (1981), 'Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions', American Economic Review, 71 (4), September, 606-20 -- Robert M. Hutchens (1989), 'Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (4), Fall, 49-64 -- Edward P. Lazear (2000), 'The Future of Personnel Economics', Economic Journal, 110, November, F611-F639 -- Bruno S. Frey (1993), 'Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty', Economic Inquiry, XXXI (4), October, 663-70 -- Armen A. Alchian (1969), 'Corporate Management and Property Rights', in Henry G. Manne (ed) (ed.), Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 337-60Summary: Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 -- Oliver Hart (1995), 'Established Theories of the Firm' and 'The Property Rights Approach' in Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Chapters 1 and 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 15-28, 29-55, references -- Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), Fall, 73-94 -- Adam Gifford, Jr. (1991), 'A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm', Public Choice, 68, 91-106 -- Henry Hansmann (1996), 'A Theory of Enterprise Ownership', in The Ownership of Enterprise, Part I, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 11-49, notes -- Benjamin Ward (1958), 'The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism', American Economic Review, XLVIII (4), September, 566-89 -- Eirik G. Furubotn (1988), 'Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property-Rights Analysis', Journal of Business, 61 (2), April, 165-81 -- Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992), 'Peer Pressure and Partnerships', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (4), August, 801-17 -- Henry Hansmann (1987), 'Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization', in Walter W. Powell (ed) (ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Chapter 2, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 27-42 -- Edwin G. West (1989), 'Nonprofit Organizations: Revised Theory and New Evidence', Public Choice, 63 (2), November, 165-74 -- Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (1), April, 223-33 -- G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), 'The Economics of Franchise Contracts', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (3), October, 503-26 -- Robert E. Martin (1988), 'Franchising and Risk Management', American Economic Review, 78 (5), December, 954-68 -- Antony W. Dnes (1992), '"Unfair" Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 148 (3), September, 484-504 -- Alanson P. Minkler (1992), 'Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 148 (2), June, 240-59 -- Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1), Spring, 173-83 -- Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (2), October, 297-326 -- Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), 'Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration', Journal of Law and Economics, XXV (2), October, 321-8PPN: PPN: 1023448203Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE
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