John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling / edited by Howard R. Vane, Chris Mulhearn

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Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Buch (Online)Sprache: Englisch Reihen: Elgar research reviews in economics | Edward Elgar E-Book ArchiveVerlag: Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2009Beschreibung: 1 Online-Ressource : ill ; cmISBN:

9781785362866

Schlagwörter: Genre/Form:

Andere physische Formen: Erscheint auch als: John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling. Druck-Ausgabe. Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, 2009. XIII, 544 S.DDC-Klassifikation:

330 22

MSC: MSC: *91-06 | 00B15 | 00B60 | 01A75RVK: RVK: QE 800LOC-Klassifikation:

HB75

DOI: DOI: 10.4337/9781785362866Online-Ressourcen:

Zusammenfassung: This groundbreaking series brings together a critical selection of key papers by the Nobel Memorial Laureates in Economics that have helped shape the development and present state of economics. The editors have organised this comprehensive series by theme and each volume focuses on those Laureates working in the same broad area of study. The careful selection of papers within each volume is set in context by an insightful introduction to the Laureates' careers and main published works. This landmark series will be an essential reference for scholars throughout the worldZusammenfassung: Recommended readings (Machine generated): John C. Harsanyi (1967), 'Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III, Part I. The Basic Model', Management Science, 14 (3), November, 159-82 -- John C. Harsanyi (1968a), 'Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points', Management Science, 14 (5), January, 320-34 -- John C. Harsanyi (1968b), 'Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game', Management Science, 14 (7), March, 486-502 -- John F. Nash, Jr. (1950a), 'Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48-9 -- John F. Nash, Jr. (1950b), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- John Nash (1951), 'Non-Cooperative Games', Annals of Mathematics, 54 (2), September, 286-95 -- John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40 -- R. Selten (1975), 'Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 4 (1), 25-55 -- Reinhard Selten (1983), 'A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability', European Economic Review, 22 (1), June, 33-57 -- Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), 'Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of "Tit for Tat"', Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 7 (1), March, 115-16 -- Reinhard Selten (1990), 'Bounded Rationality', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (4), December, 649-58 -- Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), 'Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 517-55 -- Robert J. Aumann (1959), 'Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games', in A.W. Tucker (ed) and R.D. Luce (ed) (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV. Annals of Mathematics Studies 40, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 287-324 -- Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), 'Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament', in Robert J. Aumann (ed) and Michael B. Maschler (ed) (1995), Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, Chapter 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-41, references [originally published in Mathematica Report ST-80] -- Robert J. Aumann (1974), 'Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, March, 67-96 -- Robert J. Aumann (1976), 'Agreeing to Disagree', Annals of Statistics, 4 (6), 1236-39 -- Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd S. Shapley (1976), 'Long-Term Competition: A Game-Theoretic Analysis', mimeo. Hebrew University. Reprinted in N. Megiddo (ed) (ed.) (1994), Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler, Essay 1, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1-15 -- Robert J. Aumann (1987), 'Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (1), January, 1-18 -- Thomas C. Schelling (1956), 'An Essay on Bargaining', American Economic Review, XLVI (3), June, 281-306Zusammenfassung: Thomas C. Schelling (1957), 'Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War', Conflict Resolution, 1 (1), March, 19-36 -- Thomas C. Schelling (1971), 'Dynamic Models of Segregation', Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1 (2), July, 143-86 -- Thomas C. Schelling (1980), 'The Intimate Contest for Self- Command', Public Interest, 60, Summer, 94-118 -- Thomas C. Schelling (1983), 'Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command', in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed) (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume IV, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 43-79 -- Thomas C. Schelling (1984), 'Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74 (2), May, 1-11PPN: PPN: 1023448696Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE | ZDB-1-EWE-ebook

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