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The history of modern U.S. corporate governance / Brian R. Cheffins

By: Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: Elgar research reviews in economics | Edward Elgar E-Book ArchivePublisher: Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd, 2011Description: 1 Online-Ressource ; cmISBN:
  • 9781784714093
Other title:
  • History of modern United States corporate governance
  • Modern U.S. corporate governance
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Erscheint auch als: The history of modern U.S. corporate governance. Druck-Ausgabe. Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, 2011LOC classification:
  • KF1414
DOI: DOI: 10.4337/9781784714093Online resources: Summary: This research review is a unique resource for those seeking a historical overview of the development of corporate governance. The papers trace the evolution of US corporate governance from the time when the subject became prominent in the 1970s to the present day. Topics canvassed include the board of directors, executive pay, shareholder activism and the regulatory structure that shapes corporate governance in the US. The primary focus is on the governance challenges posed by the separation of ownership and control, a hallmark of larger US public companiesSummary: Recommended readings (Machine generated): Mark J. Roe (2005), 'The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance', Corporate Governance Law Review, 1 (1), 1-19 -- Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank (2009), 'Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?', Business History Review, 83 (3), Autumn, 443-74 -- Alfred Rappaport (1990), 'The Staying Power of the Public Corporation', Harvard Business Review, 68 (3), January-February, 96-104 -- Allen Kaufman and Lawrence Zacharias (1992), 'From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920-1980', Business History Review, 66 (3), Summer, 523-72 -- Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (2001), 'The End of History for Corporate Law', Georgetown Law Journal, 89 (2), January, 439-68 -- Adam Winkler (2004), 'Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History', Law and Contemporary Problems, 67 (4), Autumn, 109-33 -- William C. Greenough and Peter C. Clapman (1980), 'The Role of Independent Directors in Corporate Governance', Notre Dame Law Review, 56 (5), October, 916-25 -- Victor Brudney (1982), 'The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?', Harvard Law Review, 95 (3), January, 597-659 -- Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. Butler (1984), 'Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director', George Washington Law Review, 52 (4-5), May-August, 557-81 -- Jeffrey N. Gordon (2007), 'The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices', Stanford Law Review, 59 (6), April, 1465-568 -- David Kraus (1976), 'The "Devaluation " of the American Executive', Harvard Business Review, 54 (3), May-June, 84-94 -- Arch Patton (1985), 'Those Million-Dollar-a-Year Executives', Harvard Business Review, 63 (1), January-February, 56-8, 60-62 -- Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), 'CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How', Harvard Business Review, 68 (3), May-June, 138-53 -- John Balkcom and Roger Brossy (1997), 'Executive Pay - Then, Now, and Ahead', Executive Compensation, Fall, 55-64, reset -- Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2005), 'Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues', Journal of Corporation Law, 30 (4), Summer, 647-73 -- John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and Randall S. Thomas (2005), 'Is U.S. CEO Compensation Broken?', Journal of Applied Corporate Governance, 17 (4), Fall, 97-104 -- Bayless Manning (1958), 'Reviews: The American Stockholder. By J.A. Livingston', Yale Law Journal, 67 (8), July, 1477-96 -- Bernard S. Black (1992), 'Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5 (3), Fall, 19-32 -- Michael E. Porter (1992), 'Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System', Harvard Business Review, 70 (5), September-October, 65-82Summary: Robert C. Pozen (1994), 'Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists', Harvard Business Review, 72 (1), January-February, 140-49, reset -- Franklin R. Edwards and R. Glenn Hubbard (2000), 'The Growth of Institutional Stock Ownership: A Promise Unfulfilled', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 13 (3), Fall, 92-104 -- Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2007), 'Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155 (5), May, 1021-93 -- Lynn A. Stout (2007), 'The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control', Regulation, Spring, 42-7 -- Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110-20 -- The President (1985), 'The Market for Corporate Control', in Economic Report of the President, Chapter 6, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 187-216 -- Peter F. Drucker (1986), 'Corporate Takeovers - What is to Be Done?', Public Interest, Winter, 3-24 -- Allen Kaufman and Ernest J. Englander (1993), 'Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the Restructuring of American Capitalism', Business History Review, 67 (1), Spring, 52-97 -- Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2002), 'How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law', University of Chicago Law Review, 69 (3), Summer, 871-915 -- Brian Cheffins and John Armour (2008), 'The Eclipse of Private Equity', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 33 (1), 1-67 -- Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan (2001), 'Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), Spring, 121-44 -- Ronald J. Gilson (2006), 'Catalysing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the United States System in the 1980s and 1990s', Company and Securities Law Journal, 24 (3), May, 143-60 -- Donald E. Schwartz (1984), 'Federalism and Corporate Governance', Ohio State Law Journal, 45 (3), 545-89 -- Robert B. Thompson (2003), 'Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation', Wake Forest Law Review, 38 (3), 961-82 -- Roberta S. Karmel (2005), 'Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas - The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 30 (1), 79-144 -- Steven A. Ramirez (2007), 'The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance Law', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 32 (2), 345-92 -- Frank H. Easterbrook (2009), 'The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance', Virginia Law Review, 95 (4), June, 685-706PPN: PPN: 1023449463Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-EWE | ZDB-1-EWE-ebook
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