Bank runs and moral hazard : a review of deposit insurance / Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt
Contributor(s): Resource type: Ressourcentyp: Buch (Online)Book (Online)Language: English Series: World Bank E-Library Archive | Policy research working paper ; 8589Publisher: Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group, September 2018Description: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten) : IllustrationenSubject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Erscheint auch als: Bank Runs and Moral Hazard: A Review of Deposit Insurance. Druck-Ausgabe Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018DOI: DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8589Online resources: Summary: Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositors' confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. This paper reviews the economic costs and benefits of deposit insurance and highlights the importance of institutions and specific design features for how well deposit insurance schemes work in practicePPN: PPN: 1040812686Package identifier: Produktsigel: ZDB-1-WBA | ZDB-110-WBONo physical items for this record
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